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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE. OF UTAH
KIMBALL ELEVATOR COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
8066

-vs.-

ELEVATOR SUPPLIES COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,
Defendant and

Ap~pellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
This is an action between an elevator company and
an elevator parts supplier.
The record of facts and circumstances surrounding
the issues is rather voluminous due to the long course of
dealings between the parties out of which the cause of
action arose.
The plaintiff, Kimball Elevator Company, has operated in Utah since 1922, first as an individual or partnership and later as a corporation (R. 228). It maintained a business association with the defendant, Elevator Supplies Company, which may be seen at the Medical
Arts Building, Salt Lake City, March 2, 1926, and with
the rnstalla tion of three passenger eleva tors at Hotel
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Utah, Salt Lake City, in 1930 (R. 230). These installations made by the plaintiff company, included a flashlight signal system and night bell furnished by the
defendant (R. 230, 269). On the Hotel Utah and the
Medical Arts, as on all other elevator p-rojects, the defendant quoted on certain equipment to the plaintiff and
the plaintiff installed or performed the elevator work
(R. 271).
THE F:ACTS
Thus, from 1926 the plaintiff did business with the
defendant· corporation, purchased elevator supplies in
the defendant's line of manufacture, and on jobs of any
size conferred at the job site with Mr. Roy C. Smith, the
defendants area district 1nanager (R. 272).
World War II caused n1aterial shortages in n1any
phases of our domestic economy. The ·elevator business
was not excepted. One of the consequences was an
attempt by many buildings to keep obsolete or worn
machines in sufficient repair to operate until a con1plete
overhaul or "modernization" could be secured and the
latest safety features installed.
Elevator "modernizations" are designed to increase
speed and safety of operation. The hand lever, controlled
by an operator, for starting, speed of movement and_
stopping, is not seen in a modern type. Instead, the passenger~ .entering the elevator call out their floors. The
operator pushes corresponding buttons on the operating
panel. As the car rises it stops automatically at each
of these floors, the doors opening of thernselves as the
elevato~, reaches exactly the level of the floor. On the
other h·and a. person on an upper floor may signal an

2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

approaching elevator. By pressing a button he registers
the nu1nber of his floor and the car stops automatically
'vithout the aid of the operator. The operator has nothing
to do but close doors for it is the closing of the doors
"Thich releases the starting 1nechanism and starts the
car auton1atically.
Following the close of the War and the lifting of
1naterial restrictions, new construction surged and every
ntajor hotel and public service building in the interInountain country considered plans to "modernize" its
passenger elevators. The plaintiff and the defendant
co1npanies worked together to secure this business. The
plaintiff company acted as the original contractor taking
responsibility for elevator renovation and the overall
job. The defendant company, a supplier as its very name
designates it to be, furnished and proposed to furnish
to the plaintiff certain relay, signal and other electrical
equip1nent. The defendant corporation has never acted
as an original contractor until Septe1nber 27, 1950, when
it contracted to repair the elevators at the Hotel Utah,
under contract pTice $79,27 4.00, later increased to $85,554.00 (R. 235-256).
Defendant did not manufacture the Inaster controls
'vhich operate the hoisting motors, it furnished relay controls - commonly referred to as the signal system and
trade named "synchron control," "collective- selective,"
"duplux selective," etc. The relay system registered all
passenger calls from hall buttons on a relay panel, which
transferred or relayed the call to the "controls" which
reduce the speed as the elevator entered th·e zone of the
call (R. 27 4) .

3
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A complete job required control equipn1ent beyond
the signal systems engineered by the defendant con1pany.
Therefore plaintiff purchased the necessary control panel
from other elevator companies, such as 1Iurphy Elevator
Company, whose representatives were introduced to
plaintiff by defendant (R. 276) because the relay control manufactured by defendant worked in conjunction
with the control panel manufactured by ~Iurphy Elevator
Company (R. 274-275).
In keeping with the arrange1nent of the three companies, defendant would furnish the signal relay equipment, Murphy Elevator Company the controls, l{ilnball
the elevator work, thereby being able to compete ·with
any company in the field (R. 280), and whereby proposals
were made to various and innumerable buildings and
firms.
Not only were negotiations made through formal
written proposals but also by word of mouth with building management and representatives. Mr. Roy C. Sn1ith,
district manager of the Elevator Supplies Company, frequently accompanied Daniel W. Connole, plaintiff's
manager, to the job sites and on some occasions talked
elevators with the building owners or engineers. Together with Connole, R.oy C. Smith visited the ~Iedical
Arts Building, Salt Lake City (R. 282-283), and as sho,vn
by Exhibit "R", in April of 1946, at the instance of the
plaintiff, one of the men1bers of the Board of Directors
of the Medical Arts Building while in San FTancisco,
California, was shown various relay control systems in
operation, in which equipment furnished by defendant
had been installed (R. 284). As shown by the evidence

4
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pre~ented

to the Court and jury (Exh. "Y", R. 294), Roy
C. S1nith of the defendant conferred with plaintiff in
regard to the visit to San Francisco of the member of the
board of directors of Medical Arts Building.
. A.t no time did the plaintiff company receive or

request quotations on systems competitive to that furnished by the defendant (R. 302-303).
The Synchron System of Elevator Supplies was
further explained at Salt Lake City to the board of directors of the Medical Arts Building by Mr. Connole of the
respondent company and Mr. Roy C. Smith of the appellant company, both orally and by "cuts" or illustrations
(R.. 285), as to the efficient manner in which this system
would handle passengers in the elevators, as proposed
(Exh. "S").
Alma J. Janke, managing engineer at the Medical
Arts Building, stated that he became acquainted with
Roy C. Smith of defendant company (R. 444) when Smith
would drop into the Medical Arts Building with Connole.
It "\Vas then contemplated that the elevators would be
modernized and the job was discussed (R. 445). Mr.
Connole suggested that Janke go to New York and Louisville, Kentucky to see defendant's synchron control equipment. Later, following his trip, Janke stated the equipment "\Vas installed under Mr. Connole's supervision (R.
417).
At the same time the Murphy Elevator Company
was also quoting Kimball on the price of the material it
would furnish (Exh. "T" and "U", R. 289).
Upon receipt of the data from the Elevator Supplies

5
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Company and the incorporation of all estimates the plaintiff 1nade its proposal, June 28 1947 to the Medical Arts
'
'
Building for the modernization of two elevators and the
supply of one new and complete machine (Exh. "V", R.
290). Plaintiff secured the job, supervised the completion
of the installation and Kimball thresholq na1ne plates
were installed upon the cabs (Exh. "W", R. 291).
Later Mr. Connole and Mr. Roy C. Sn1ith brought
Jerry Smith of the Hotel Utah over to the l\1:edical Arts
Building to see the job in operation (R.. 449). Janke
stated that there had been some discussions between hhn,
Mr. Connole and Mr. Roy C. Smith of the defendant that
he would be employed in installing equipment at the hotel
if Connole got the Utah Hotel contract (R. 451).
Some technical electrical engineering was required
whereupon Roy C. Smith of the defendant corporation
advised Kimball to contact Charles M. Henker of the
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company of San Francisco, California: He was engaged by Kimball for final
tuning of the control systems on the Medical Arts (Exh.
"X", R. 293) ..
Kin1ball Elevator name plates were on the cabs at the
Medical Arts Building before modernization and also
afterwards.
While the job at the Medical Arts Building was
under consideration and negotiation and the actual letting of the contract and work was accomplished, there
were many oth.er jobs under consideration which required
the joint attention and cooperation of the parties.
On October 2, 1947, plaintiff received proposals from
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the .J[urphy Elevator pertaining to the Belvedere ApartInents, Salt Lake City, Utah, which included Elevator
Supplies Company door operator, cab door hangers,
hatch door hangers, hatch doors, signal equipment, indicator lanterns, upper flow flash light annunciator. The
bid to the Belvedere Apartments management was made
by Kimball (Exh. "Z", R. 300).
The Utah Childrens Hospital or "Polio Hospital"
at the University of Utah was engineered, esti1nated and
bid upon in the same fashion. Kimball forwarded specifications to both l\1urphy Elevator Company and the Elevator Supplies Company. For this job the Kimball Elevator Company included in its bid to the State the use
of the Elevator Supplies Company signal system, referred to as "directional collective control," and also car
position indicators and door operators. At no time did
the plaintiff company receive <?T ask for quotations from
any other company on similar equipment (Exh. AA, R.
302).

Plaintiff and defendant carried on correspondence
relative to elevators to be installed or modernized for the
:Jiountain Fuel Supply Company at Salt Lake City. As
of s.eptember 15, 1948 plaintiff subnlitted a bid on the
project in which plaintiff specified and i.ncluded, were it
a successful bidder, automatic "directional collective control'' \Vith and without attendant, and variable voltage
control with automatic two-way leveling to be furnished
on an installed basis by the defendant company (Exh.
"BB", R. 305).
The parties contacted each other concerning an elevator project known as the Continental State Bank of

7
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Boise, Idaho, and on September 2 1948 the defendant
'
company furnished the plaintiff 'a proposal
covering
synchron control, with "cuts" or illustrations and photographs of the material and an estimate sheet which set
forth such work as would be done by the Murphy Elevator Company (Exh. "CC", R. 306).
Later the parties worked out an alternate proposal
on the Boise job and plain tiff bid to install a synchron
control unit and an L. D. M. operator with safety-edge
for the doors, door arms, interlocks and hangers,-all to
be furnish_ed by defendants (Exh. "DD", R. 307).
The Idaho State Hospital, Blackfoot, Idaho, ca1ne
up for bid. Plaintiff secured specifications and forwarded copies to the Murphy Elevator Company and to
the defendant. Plaintiff thereafter included collective
selective control as manufactured by the Elevator Supplies Company in its bid (Exh. "EE", R. 509).
The parties also attempted to secure the contract
on the Idaho State Hospital at Pocatello. This was a
complete new elevator with variable voltage selective control, as was always done, Kimball forwarded the specifications on this propect to the Elevator Supplies Company
and the Murphy Elevator Company. Murphy Elevator
and defendant submitted cost quotations to Kimball setting forth the number of erection hours which would be
required at the job site (Exh. "F'F", R. 311). Cuts furnished by Murphy Elevator Company reflected the Elevator Supplies equipment to be used. These cuts were
handed by Kimball to the architects of the project (Exh.
"GG", R. 312).
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The cooperation of both. con1panies on the elevator
construction job at the new Shriner's Hospital, Salt Lake
City is shown by the exhibit "HH" (R. 313), \vherein 11r.
Dan vV. Connole on Decernber 18, 1947 addressed a letter
on behalf of plaintiff to Elevator Supplies Cornpany, Inc.,
at San Francisco, California, enclosing specifications on
the job. Defendant in turn communicated with the Murphy Company, with a copy to plaintiff1 p-roposing to
furnish and install collective selective control, electric
door operators and signals. Upon receipt of the overall
inforrnation Kimball bid the job to the general contractors on the project (R. 313-314).
Prior to the submission of the foregoing mentioned
'.
'
bid, (at the· request of Roy Smith, Di~trict Manager of
the defendant company), on or about December 21, 1~48,
the W. S. Tyler Company and the Dahlstrom Company
quoted Kimball on the doors and cabs (Exh. "II", R.
314).
On October 22, 1946, the plaintiff company secured
a contract for the installation of signal equipment and
door closers, at the Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake
City, on !our passenger elevators and issued an order
thereon to the Elevator Supplies Company (R. 354).
Thereafter, the Walker Bank Building decided to completely· modernize the elevators and entered into a cancellation agreement (Exh. "F'FF") with Kimball. Plaintiff protected the defendant on the job by insisting that
as a condition to the cancellation the defenda,nt be
awarded the supply of ·electrical power door operators
(R. 356). The contract for modernization was later
R\varded in part to Kimball Elevator and in part to Otis
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Elevator Company and Elevator Supplies furnished the
door operators.
Roy C. Smith also substantiated Connole in cancelling with Walker Bank. Kimball made the arrangen1ent
and requirement that Otis would use Elevator Supplie~
equipment (R~ 909).
Upon receipt from the architects of specifications for
elevators in the Ben Albert Apartments to be constructed
at Salt Lake City, the Kimball Elevator Company forwarded copies to Elevator Supplies Inc. and to the 1\{urphy Elevator Company, whereupon quotations were returned dated August 30, 1949, including directional collective control and L. D. M. Door operators manufactured
by the defendant corporation. (Exh. "JJ", R. 316-317)
(Admitted R. 334).
The manager of the defendant company for this area,
Roy Casper Smith, would in many instances accon1pany
Mr. Connole of Kimball to the job site and together confer 'vith the manage1nent (R. 318).
Another typical project worked upon by the parties
was the Latter Day Saints Primary Hospital at Salt Lake
City. Noven1ber 7, 1949, the defendant quoted to plaintiff
on installation of directional collective control. Cuts of
this equipment were furnished plaintiff to be shown the
architects.
So that Elevator Supplies and l\{urphy would not
duplicate the work, they tell Kimball Company:
"We h;ave included an extra copy of our proposal in case you want to send this to Murphy so
that they can check to see there is no duplication"
(Exh. "KK", R. 320) .
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l(iinball Eleva tor Company thereafter subn1i tted a bid
specifically including Elevator Supplies equipn1ent in its
proposal. Kin1ball did not receive or ask for quotations
on shnilar equipment from any other co1npany (R. 321),
and as 'vas customary, at the request of Roy C. S.mith
of the Elevator Supplies, the Tyler Cab Co1npany and
the Dahlstron1 Company each sub1nitted quotations on
cabs for the L. D. S. Primary Hospital from district
offices in San Francisco to the plaintiff co1npany at Salt
Lake City (Exh. "LL", R. 322).
The development of the Medical Center at the University of Utah commenced with the Cancer Research
Building and the plaintiff and defendant companies were
interested in the elevators (R. 322). Plaintiff secured
specifications and sent copies thereof to defendant at San
Franicsco. 11urphy Elevator Co1npany quoted on its portion of the job, and the Dahlstrom and the Tyler Cab
Companies at the request of Roy C. Smith, district rnanager of the defendant company, submitted a bid to Kimball
on the cabs (Exh. "MM", December 12,1949, R. 323). The
plaintiff placed a bid which included and specified the
directional collective equipment manufactured by the
defendant corporation. Plaintiff did not seek nor receive
proposals on similar systems from any oth.er company
or source.
The Memorial Building erected by Daughters of
Utah Pioneers at Salt Lake City was considered by the
parties and on May 31, 1949, the Elevator Sup·plies Company submitted its proposals on the electric door operators and sheave hangers for the hydraulic passenger
elevator Kimball proposed to erect (Exh. "NN", R. 325).

11
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On June 5, 1947, plaintiff also bid on the !)rice Hotel
at Price, Utah, specifying defendant's directional collective relay system and Murphy Elevator Company's controls (Exh. "K", R. 277). The construction of the foundation had been completed and then the work stopped.
Interest was revived and again the companies, appellant
and respondent, corresponded efforts to secure the job.
As shown by Exhibit "00" (R. 326), defendant and
Murphy Elevator equipment was designed to propose
and obtain a complete new elevator.
"Cuts" or illustrative plates of the equipment of
Murphy Company with defendant's material in place
were furnished for display and for use in making quotations to customers (Exh. "PP", R . 328).
Daniel \V. Connole, of the plaintiff company, and
Roy Casp-er Smith of the defendant company, together.
visited the Dooley Building at Salt Lake City prior to
August 3, 1948 (R. 331). This elev-ator modernization
included as a portion of the work a complete collective
selective button type control with electric operators· -and
automatic leveling on both elevators. Pictures and mimeographed engineering sh-eets were furnished the plaintiff
company by the Elevator Supplies for type of car S"~itch
panels and selectors as manufactured by defendant.
These photographs 'vere taken to the Dooley Building
manage1nent by the plaintiff co1npany (Exh. "SS", R.
335-336). Specifications had been p~epared by a firm of
architects at Salt Lake City on the entire job (Exh. "QQ"
and 'RR"). Quotations were 1nade to the plaintiff by the
defe~dant, and the Murphy Elevator Company also
quoted on its portion of the work.

12
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The files of the Kimball Elevator Company also
sho'v that the elevator planned in the Annex of the
R.ogers Hotel at Idaho Falls was worked upon by the
parties to this action. Specifications were forwarded to
defendant by plaintiff and, as shown by exhibit "TT",
car door operators, car door hangers and signal annunciators "\Vere proposed by the defendant and a bid made to
the 1nanagement by plaintiff (R. 336).
Prior to October, 1946, plaintiff company had been
conferring 'vith the management of the Continental Bank
Building for some time (Exh. "VV", R. 340). Elevator
Supplies Company proposed to Kimball for complete
synchron control in modernization of the four elevators
at that building. ·As time developed, on May 4, 1949,
another proposal \vas for,varded and the Murphy Elevator Company gave its estimate on its equipment, together
"\vith defendant and plaintiff on the job. The Dahlstrom
1Ietallic Door Company made estimates from its home
office (Exh. "XX") and furnished cuts of cabs (R. 341).
In the latter part of 1948 or early '49· Dan W. Connole of the Kimball Elevator Company, Roy C. Smith of
Elevator Supplies Company and Charles W. Henker of
the Pacific 'Elevator and equipment Company visited
the Con tin en tal Bank Building and "talked" eleva tors
with the O"\Vners, engineers and management of the hank
building (R. 342). The trio discussed in detail modernization of the elevators by use of Elevator Supplies and
Pacific Elevator equipment (R. 343). As a result of this
conference, an engineers' estimate was prepared by the
three companies in order that the hank could call for bids
(Exh. "YY", R .. 343). The original of this estimate was

13
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given to the board of directors. The Kimball Company
had not and did not contact any other company for proposals on similar equipment (R. 345).
Together with Pacific Elevator and Equip1nent Coinpany, the Kimball Elevator Company working 'vith the
defendant attempted to secure a job at the Zion's Benefit Building Society, Salt Lake City. The Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company (assuming the part theretofore occupied by Murphy) indicated what it 'vould furnish Kimball on the job exclusive of the Elevator Supplies Company.
On the Congress Hotel at Salt Lake City, Mr.
Connole, manager of the plaintiff, requested Henker of
the Pacific Comp·any to get together with the Elevator
Sup~plies Company and make a quotation on the job and
on _September 6, 1950, Elevator Supplies Co1npany submitted ·its quotation to Kimball (Exh. '"BBB", R. 347348).
On the University Heights Apartments at S-alt Lake
City on November 1, 1950, the Elevator Supplies Company and the Pacific Elevator Company submitted their
proposal in conformity with the defendant (E:xh. "'CCC",
R. 349). The W. S. Tyler Company placed its quotation
to Kimball on the cabs.
The Charleston Apartments at S-alt Lake City were
also acted upon by the parties. On April3, 1950 Kimball
sent the specific-ations to Elevato~ Supplies Company
and also to the Pacific Elevator Company (R. 350) :and
on April 10, 1950 Elevator Supplies replied to Kimball
stating: "We have talked this job over with Pacific and
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the equipment we have quoted on will tie in with their
equipment." The defendant also advised the plaintiff
that they had been in touch with the Tyler and Dahlstrom
people and that Kimball would receive a quotation on the
cabs (Exh. '"DDD", R. 351).
There was also an elevator project at the Deseret
Ne,vs Building, Salt Lake City, in the spring of 1950. At
that tin1e the Kin1ball Company requested Elevator Supplies refer the "elevator parts" to Mr. Henker of the
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company at San Francisco, California. Mr. Smith of the Elevator Supplies
Company talked the job over with Henker (R. 338) and
the W. S. Tyler Company, and Dahlstrom Cab Companies, at the request of Roy Smith, also made quotations
to Kimball. As shown by exhibit "UU", the job was bid
by Kimball with Pacific Elevator furnishing the hoisting
equipment and controls and Elevator Supplies the door
operators, the controller, the safety edge, car door contacts and the closers and interlocks.
Charles Maynard Henker testified that he has been
in the elevator business since 1924 and is a registered
electrical engineer of the State of California. He told the
court and jury that his company engaged in a complete
line of elevator work (R. 660) and that in October, 1949,
he 'vas engaged by plaintiff company in an engineering
capacity on the Medical Arts job and that on the occasion
he discussed with Connole and Roy C. Smith jobs coming
up in the area including the Hotel Utah (R. 662). Henker
described the functions and type of equipment to be furnished by Elevator Supplies and that by Pacific Elevator
and Equipment Company (R. 670).
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Henker further testified that he conferred with ~Ir.
Roy C. Smith on several jobs to be perforn1ed at Salt
Lake City, such as the Charleston Apart1nent (R·. 680),
and the Desert News Building (R. 681, Exh. "B"). He
stated: "it is another typical job of the type wherein all
three collaborated" (R. 783). He described the Congress
Hotel as being "the usual deal between Pacific Elevator
'
Elevator Supplies and Kimball" (R. 683). The l . . niversity Heights apartments (R. 686, Exh. "D") ·were
quoted upon by Pacific to Kimball. Henk~r further stated
that his company manufactures relay and control equipment comparable to that of Elevator Supplies (R. 688)
but that they had never been asked to bid on such equipment in this area by Kimball. Henker further confirn1ed
the fact that Dan Connole introduced him to representatives of the Continental Bank Building in the co1npany
of Roy C. Smith of Elevator Supplies and that on the
occasion of that visit the three co1npanies came up with
a round figure estimate which was given to the Continental management (R. 690). He said it was the type of
job Elevator Supplies would do under an elevator contractor (R. 692). As shown by his testimony and letters
to Kimball Henker of the Pacific Elevator would confer
'
with Smith of Elevator Supplies on equipment Elevator
S·upplies would furnish before quoting to Kimball (R.
701, 703).
Concerning the Hotel Utah-· in November of 1947,
the plaintiff wrote to both defendant and to the Murphy
Company telling the1n that the 1nanagement of the hotel
had requested prices and estimates on the modernization
of the three passenger elevators (Exh. "GGG", R. 3570).
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The Elevator Supplies Company on November 18, 1947,
1uade a quotation to Kimball and ~furphy for synchron
control, car relay panels, selectors, car push panel buttons and annunciator push button boxes and indicators
'vith all necessary pipe, wire fittings and cable- on an
installed basis. The plaintiff never asked for and did
not receive quotations fron1 any other con1pany. The
hotel did not proceed on this project but put in two new
service elevators at the rear of the building.
Since 1947, Roy C. S1nith·, district manager of the
defendant company, in the company of Mr. Connole of
plaintiff, conferred at the Hotel Utah with the then
1nanager, the late Guy Toombs, and also the building
engineer, Jerry Smith. They discussed the type of equipnlent \vhich would be installed (R. 364). Mr. Connole of
plaintiff and Smith of the defendant company, in 1949
an<;l 1950 took the Hotel Utah building engineer to the
:Niedical Arts Building to see the equipment running and
how it operated (R. 365).
The parties continued to discuss the Hotel Utah job
and on J\1ay 11, 1950 the plaintiff wrote to Roy C. Smith
of the Elevator Supplies requesting that he figure th·e
job on an installed basis and also asking Smith to confer
with Charles M. Henker of the Pacific Company for a
price on three G. E. Controllers and plyathon levers in
order "that the Medical Arts job could be duplicated."
On J\Iay 16, 1950, by letter (Exh. "III"), the defendant company wrote Kimball re Hotel Utah and requested
information relative to the drive motors and generators.
Defendant said:
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. "We have your old elevator layout but outSide of the capacity and speed there does not
appear to be any data which would indicate the
size of either the drive motor or the generator"
(R. 361).
Plaintiff secured the generator readings and sent then1
on to the defendant company.
On July 13, 1950, the Pacific Elevator and Equipment Co: proposed to furnish relay panels, selectors,
cabling, and "general overhaul of the equipment with the
exception of what the Elevator Supplies people were to
do", with an estimate of the labor time involved (Exh.
"JJ J", R. 362). Pacific stated:
"This job should be the first of a lot of big
modernizations we can do in your area. You 'vill
have our close cooperation all the way through,
both in selling and installation."
On July 14, 1950, the Elevator Supplies Comp~ny
also made its quotation on the synchron control syste1n
to plaintiff company for the Hotel Utah. On August 16,
1950, the plaintiff submitted its bid to the Hotel Utah.
According to the manager of the plaintiff the bid 'vas
acco1npanied by cuts to sho'v the Elevator Supplies lines
(Exh. "KKK", R. 363).
Mr. Connole, manager of plaintiff, stated that follo,ving the submission of the Kimball bid he had a conversation with Jerry Smith, the enginer of the Hotel Utah (R.
371). There was son1e question as to whether or not the
hotel would desire to change its hall lanterns and push·
buttons. This equipment is to be furnished by Elevator
Supplies Company (R. 372). Jerry Smith told Connole
that Otis Elevator Company was not to be invited to hid
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on the job. He asked Connole if he had any suggestions
as to other companies which might desire to bid. Connole
suggested Westinghouse Electric Co. Later Jerry Smith
of the Hotel Utah asked if Elevator Supplies would give
a bid on the total job. Connole stated he did not know.
That it would be identical equipment and if Smith wanted
to use it as an estimate he could do so to find if the Kimball bid was in line. Smith said he wanted it for the
Board. ~ir. Connole stated at that time:
"I explained to Mr. Jerry Smith it would have
to be a supporting bid because it was identically
the same manufacturer and people doing the work.
He knew that. I told him the bid would be identically the same people; and I could not see what
justification there would be for having two people
bid on identically the same equipment (R. 575576).
(R. 373). Connole telephoned Elevator Supplies a.t San
Francisco and talked with Roy C. Smith. Connole told
R. C. S.mith the Hotel Utah would like to have a proposal
on the overall job to verify the Kimball bid and justification of the price quoted.
Thereafter, Smith and Henker conferred in San
Francisco. Henker said :

"Q. We want you to tell us, Mr. Henker, just
as well as you can remember, what was said between you.
"A. Well, I was probably asked by R.oy
Smith if I would consider presenting a bid from
Pacif~c Elevator and Equipment Company for this
part of the work. which would include, well, all
the work previously tendered to Kimball Elevator
Company, and our own, and on an installed basis,
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\vhich was quite a great deal n1ore to Pacific
Elevator and Equip1nent Company than had previously been in the l(imball bid.
"Q. What was said between you when this
took place~
".l\_. When that took place I said, 'well, it \vill
be perfectly all right with Pacific Elevator and
Equipment Company, if it is all right with l(imball Elevator Company, to go ahead on that basis.'
After all, we had a bid already in to l(iinball and
it was the most natural thing for us to say, 'if it
is okay with Ki1nball Elevator Company, it will be
all right'. I think we talked about it with the idea
that they wanted two bids. In other words, they
only had one bid and they wan,ted two bid,s, whic·h
would let them, know abo~~t where they stood, I
imagin,e, with their first bid.
"Q. Did they let the Hotel Utah know where
they stood~
"A. Yes. That is a normal procedure of
buyers of that type. Of course, that is what necessitated the trip for Roy and I, going up there and
making the survey that we did."

*

* * *

*

"Q. Now, if we understand you correctly,
you told Mr. Smith, of Elevator Supplies Company, that you would not make a quotation to
Elevator Supplies without a clearance from Kimball~

"A.

That is correct.

"Q. What did Mr. Smith say to you when
you told him that~
"A. The best I can recall, Roy had the same
imp,ression that that was a bid, a check bid, and
naturally it was going to be high.er, being done out
of San Francisco both by ourselves and them20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

selves. I think the feeling was mutual between us,
at least it was 1ny impression that the bid would
be so much higher that there would be nothing to
it; that the contract would automatically go to
Kimball Elevator Company."
Gerald Smith also testified that on August 17 he
requested Roy C. Smith to make a bid and that Roy Smith
then stated he \vould have to take the matter under considerat1on and contact his home office for an opinion
frorn theu1 before he could give a definite answer (R.
789). Approximately three days later Roy C. Smith conferred by telephone from Seattle and told Gerald Smith
he thought they vvould be interested.
Jerry S.mith stated he knew that the Elevator Supplies had already quoted on the job to the Kimball Elevator Company.
Roy C. Smith further testified that following his
company's bid to the Kimball Elevator Company, he
received a call on August 17, 1950, from Mr. Jerry Smith
of the Hotel Utah asking for a bid on the entire job (R.
883) ; that he told Jerry Smith he would have to think it
over; and that conversation was on Thursday. On the
following Tuesday he talked from Seattle to Jerry Smith
and told him he (R. C. Smith) would have to get in touch
vvith nir. Fanning (home office) and would let him know
as soon as possible (R. 884).
Henker further stated that when they arrived at Salt
Lake City he discussed the matter with Connole and
Smith and that they indicated they were in agreement
(R. 677).
Connole postively states that he requested Roy C.
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Smith to n1ake a supporting bid (R,. 546) ~ that he spent
several evenings wih 1\!r. Henker \vhile he \vas in Salt
Lake City to estimate the job and that Mr Henker never
expected to make a firm bid.
When Smith of defendant Co1npany had his proposal
ready to turn in to the hotel he came to the office of the
plaintiff at Salt Lake City, on the Dinwoody Furniture
job or the Utah Agricultural job, and stated the Elevator
S.upplies proposal wuold be $18,000.00 higher (R. 376).
Thereafter Smith ca1ne to the Kimball office and informed them he had been awarded the Hotel Utah contract.
On September 11, 1950, the same day that the defendant company submitted its quotation to the Hotel Utah, it
sub1nitted a revised quotation on the same job to plaintiff. Although the quotation eliminated the night attendant feature the price was raised $2,000.00 to the sum of
$34,637 (Exh. "LLL", R. 378).
When the revised quotation was made to Kimball,
the same letter stated tha.t defendant was making a direct
quotation to the hotel on "D. W." (dumb waiter) equipInent. No reference was made to a direct quotation on the
sychron control equipment (R. 379).
Smith also admitted he knew no other elevator or
supply company was making prop-osals to Kimball beyond his own company and the Pacific Elevator because
. the two systems would have to synchronize (R. 926). And
that he did not receive any request for an estimate from
Connole but his quotation was upon the request of the
Hotel (R. 927). Smith also denied any conversation con-
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cerning a supporting bid with Henker but said he was
going to tell Kimball what it was all about when he got
to Salt Lake (R. 930).
Connole considered the items of repair suggested
by the Pacific Elevator Company in its ·proposal and
indicated the cost of following through would be slight
(R. 384, 385, 386) .
:Nir. Connole compared Exhibit "I", the Kimball bid
of $59,600.00 and Exhibit "J", the Elevator Supplies
contract and stated that his quotation included all of the
vvork except the replacement of the sheaves. That Elevator Supplies had made an allowance of $3,500 per cab
and that the Kimball allowance was $1,800.00, ·but as
there was no specification on the cabs th.e exact price
could not be determined until the hotel made a selection
(R. 389).
After Roy C. Smith advised Kimball that the contract had been taken, Connole went to see Max Carp·enter,
Hotel Utah manager, and asked him if it would be possible the contract issue to Kimball. Carpenter said he had
nothing against Kimball Elevator Company and he would
check on it. The next day Carpenter told Connole the
hotel could not do so because Elevator Supplies reported
if this were done the price would have to be increased
(R. 392).
It was shown that cordial relations at all times existed
between these two companies and at no time prior to
September 27, 1950 did Kimball consider Elevator Supplies as a competitor (R. 412). At no time prior to September 27, 1950 in operations in Utah, Nevada, Wyoming,
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Montana, Washington and Idaho, had the Elevator Supplies Company acted as an original contractor.
As shown by the record (Exh. "QQQ", R. 413), on
January 13, 1950, in a letter concerning the \Teterans
Hospital at Salt Lake City, R.oy Smith advised that Elevator Supplies were not able to secure plans and specifications because they were not a prime bidder (R. 414).
The record further discloses that elevator parts purchased from the defendant by catalogue number (Exh.
"L", R. 416) were not purchased or quoted upon in the
same manner as a modernization system (R. 416).
The Kin1ball Elevator Company acts as an original
contractor (R. 420).
Mrs. Rod Con ole, secretary Kimball. Elevator Conlpa.ny, verified that Daniel W. Connole made a call to
Roy Smith at San Ftancisco on August 18, 1950; that
Connole then told Smith of the desire for a bid to verify
Kimball's quoted price; and also made request for Elevator Supplies to submit a supporting bid. Mrs. Connole
further stated that at the time of Smith's visit to Salt
Lake he stated he would make his quotation about
$18,000 to $19,000 higher than the Kimball Elevator bid.
Also at no time was Roy Smith or Elevator Supplies
considered a competitor of the plaintiff.
At no time was plaintiff's bid increased 26% (R.
421). Connole told Jerry S1nith, Engineer of the Hotel
Utah there would possibly be a slight increase in electrical equipment and at that time Smith said he was not
sure they would re-use the outside lanterns.
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The average life of an elevator is t'venty to twentyfive years, and the elevators at the Hotel Utah would not
require another complete renovation for at least that
time (R.424).
The president and manager of the plaintiff company
testified that in his opinion the advertising value to
plaintiff company of the nameplates at the thresholds of
the cabs in the passenger elevators at the Hotel Utah
'vould be $30,000 over a period of 20 years (R. 443).
Emerson S. S.rnith, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that for the past 26 years he has engaged in the
advertising and public relations field and for 13 years
past at Salt Lake City; that he is familiar with the number of rooms in the Hotel Utah, the number of service
clubs and the type of patrons and invitees using the hotel
(R. 555). He stated-a company's name on the threshold
of the three passenger elevators at the Hotel Utah would
have a value of $1,000 per year (R. 556).
He also stated that the prestige of having the equipment in the Hotel Utah would be of tremendous value
for future sales.
Smith pointed up something which has always been
true, and especially true of the elevator industry: "* * *
it has been accepted practice that the manufacturer of a
product, shall be entitled to identify it, as a protective
measure not only for the public but also for himself (R.
563, 564, 565).
The annuity schedule presented to the jury (Exh.
"UUU", R. 625), gave a guide to show the present in hand
.value q_f money which would be received at $1,000 per
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year over a ten, fifteen, twenty and twenty-five year
basis ( R. 626).
The preponderence of the evidence in every respect
_justifies the conclusion reached by the jury and its
verdict. The manager and engineer at the Hotel Utah
Company found themselves in the position of anxiously
supporting the contract signed on the hotel's behalf with
the defendant company, in view of the statements of the
witnesses for tlie plaintiff that the contract as signed
was intended as only a supporting bid. The jury had the
right to disregard their testimony in its entirety or to
believe or discredit such testimony in each of the jurors
own judgment. The circumstances surrounding statements made by both of these witnesses- n1ade the reliability of such statements so doubtful and incomparable
that the jury could put little weight on such testimony.
Both witnesses were openly anagonistic to the plaintiff's
cause and yet the record shows that prior to the filing of
the lawsuit, the plaintiff company enjoyed a very good
busines relationship with the Hotel Utah and with its
personnel.
Positi.ve Nu.mber One:

THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT NOT TO
PETE.

CO~i

The overwhelming weight of the evidence supports
the verdict of the jury and the position of the plaintiff
that through a long course of business dealings the defendant established itself as a supplier and the plaintiff
as an original contractor. It was uniform practice for
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the plaintiff to submit specifications on a job to
the defendant and request quotations on elevator !naterials f.o.b., or on control systen1s installed at the job site.
Frequently representatives of the parties would consult
and collaborate on specifications and designs 1uost suitable for the custo1ner. On many occasions representatives of both parties would jointly confer 'vith a custorner
or building owners and thereafter - based upon quotations made by the defendant to the plaintiff - plaintiff
would bid the overall and complete job. If the job were
secured the plaintiff, Kimball Elevator Co1npany of
Utah, would act as the original contractor and the defendant, Elevator Supplies Company, would act as supplier
or sub-contractor under the plaintiff.
It was conclusively established that elevator lnodernizations projects involved considerable expen-se to
building management and that such projects entailed long
term planning of i1nportance to the owner, the elevator
companies and to the elevator supplier.
In 12 Am. Jur. 498, the law is siinply and clearly
stated:
"Contracts are express or in1plied. I1nplied
contracts are implied in fact or in law. Contracts
are express when their terms are not so stated.
Contracts implied in fact are inferred from the
facts and circumstances of the case and are not
formally or explicitly stated in words, etc. It is
often stated that the only difference between an
express contract and a contract implied in fact
is that in former the parties arrive at their agreement by word, whether oral or written, sealed or
unsealed while in the latter, their agreement is
arrived at by a consideration of their acts and
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conduct, and that in both of these cases there is,
in fact, a contract existing between the parties,
the only difference being in the character of evidence necessary to establish it. (See numerous
citations)."
Considering the great abundance of proof, both oral
and docun1entary, offered by the plaintiff in proof of and
sho,ving the existence of such an agreement the honorable
court properly instructed the jury and presented for its
detern1ina tion the issue as to the existence of an agreen1ent. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff subn1its that reasonable minds could not differ as to
its existence.
Defendant seeks to attack the legality of this agreenlen through arguments which are based on the assumption that the defendant, Elevator Supplies Company, was
a competitor of plaintiff and that the agreement would
be in restraint of trade and its effect would be to stifle
competion.
The parties to this action were never competitors nor
did they ever deal at arms length. The plaintiff was
selling the defendant's supplies and control systems and
it \vas inct1mhent upon plaintiff to deal with the defendant after the plaintiff had urged the customer to use
defendant's systen1 and after plaintiff made its bid based
upon quotations received from the defendant.
It is neither the intent nor purpose of the Sherman
Act or the Clayton Act to nullify or abolish agreements
necessarily n1ade in the ordinary and regular channels
of trade. The plaintiff, without such an understanding,
would find itself in the anamalous and al,vays risky posi-
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tion of seeking quotations from the defendant, then
attempting to compete on a price to the custoiner. An1erican free enterprise would suffer, if such vvere the la-\v.

Positive Number Two:
THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT IN RESTRAINT
OF TRADE.
There is not one item of evidence in the entire record
.
which would indicate that the agreement was in rPstraint
of trade or would have the effect of stifling co1npetition
or creating a 1nonopoly. The defendant through its long
course of dealings merely promised it would not quote
direct to to building 1nanagement where plaintiff had requested a quotation from the. defendant and plaintiff
had thereafter submitted a bid to the building Inanagement. In not one instance is there shown any con1bination or agreement of competitors but rather a 1nere assurance on the part of a manufacturer or wholesaler that
it vvould not sell directly to the consumer.
The following appears in 58 C.J.S. 1023:
"In the absence of any intent or purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly, a trader or Inanufacturer engaged in an entirely private business
has a right to exercise his own independent discretion as to persons with whom he may deal, unless a refusal to deal with a person is part of an
illegal conspiracy or combination. He 1nay sell
or refuse to sell to whom he pleases, and may buy
or refuse to buy from whom he pleases. This rule
is not affected by state anti trust statutes or by
the federal anti trust acts unless the actual effect
of such conduct is substantially to lessen coinpetition or to restrain trade."
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Citing:
"The anti trust laws do not restrict the right
of a 1nanufacturer freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to the parties with whom
he will deal. U. S. v. Parker Rust Proof Co., 61
F·ed~ Supp. 805."
U. S. v. Aluminum Company of America, 447
Supp. 97, cause certified and transferred 64 S.
Ct. 1281, 322 U.S. 716, 88 L. Ed. 1557, reversed
on other grounds. C.C.A. 1487 2d 416.
The agree1nen t here, in fact, supports rather than
restrains competition. Such an agreement could not possibly establish a monopoly in derogation of the public
interest since the parties were subject to competition
from other elevator COinpanies. Even the aefendant
argued in court that it had on occasion submitted quotations to elevator companies other than plaintiff.
The following note appears in Title 15 of U.S.C.A.:
"The Sherman Act was intended to secure
equality of opportunity and to protect the public
against evils commonly incident to monopolies and
those abnormal contracts and combinations which
tend directly to suppress the conflict for advantage called 'competition' - the play of th~ contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest
desire for gain. 'The statute did not forbid or
restrain the power to make normal and usual
contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal Inethods, whether by agreement or otherwise,
to accomplish such purpose. The words "restraint of trade" should be given a 1neaning which
would not destroy th·e individual right to contract, and render difficult if not impossible any
movement of trade in the channels of interstate
co1nmerce-the free movement of which it was the
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purpose of the statute to protect.' United States
v. American Tobacco Co., N.Y. 1911, 31 S. Ct.
632, 221 U.S. 106, 179, 180, 55 L. Ed. 663, 693, 694.
See also, F'ederal Trade Connnission v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 1923, 43 S. Ct. 450, 261 U.S. 463, 67 L. Ed.
746; Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill
Posters, N.Y. 1923, 43 S. Ct. 167, 260 U.S. 501,
67 L. Ed. 368."
It was apparent that the relay control syste1ns as
developed by the Elevator Supplies Company \Vere to be
sold in a co1npetitive field and that no 1nonopoly or detriment to the public interest could possibly result through
the business practice followed by the parties to this cause.
It is further set forth in the Code:
"It has now become a settled rule that only
unreasonable restraint of trade or con11nerce are
within the prohibition of this section. Standard
Oil Co. v. U.S., No. 1911, 31 S. Ct. 502, 221 U.S.
1, 55 L. Ed. 619, Ann. Cas. 1912D·, 734, 34 L.R.A.
N.S., 834. See also, U.S. v. American Tobacco
Co., N.Y. 1911, 31 S. Ct. 632, 650, 221 U.S. 106,
55 L. Ed. 633; U. S. v. Trans-Missouri F'reight
Ass'n., Kan. 1897, 17 S. Ct. 540, 166 U.S. 290,
41 L. Ed. 1007; U.S. v. Fur Dressers' & Fur Dyers'
Ass'n., D.C.N.Y. 1925, 5 F. 2d 869; F·osburgh v.
California, etc., Sugar Refining Co., C.C.A. Cal.
1923, 291 F·. 29; Lee Line Steamers v. Memphis
Helena & Rosedale Packet Co., C.C.A. Tenn. 1922,
277 F. 5; McLatchy v. King, C.C. Mass. 1917, 250
F. 920; American Press Ass'n. v. U.S. , Ill. 1917,
245 F. 91, 157 C.C.A. 387, L.R.A. 1918A, 1039;
Paterson v. U.S., Ohio 1915, 222 F·. 599, 138 C.C.A.
123, certiorari denied 35 s. Ct. 939·, 238 U.S. 635,
59 L. Ed. 1499 ;" (The note continues with numerous federal and state citations.)
"Restrictions imposed by sections 1-7 of this
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title are not mechanical or artificial but set up
essential standard of reasonableness and called
for vigilance in detection and frustration of all
eff<?rts unduly to restrain free course of interstate commerce and do not seek to establish a mere
delusive liberty either by 1naking impossible the
nor1nal and rair expansion of that commerce or
the adoption of reasonable measure to protect it
.fron1 injurious and destructive practices and to
pron1ote con1petition on a sound basis. U. S. v.
Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co., D.C. Hawaii 1950,
87 F. Supp. 1010."
There i~ no reason at law or equity, nor no rule in
legislation or custom against selection of customers. The
agreement to refrain fro1n a d~rect quotation is not interdicted by congressional act or state law.
In ]?ederal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.
Clark Co,., 263 U.S. 564, 44 S. Ct. 162, 68 L. Ed. 448, 30
A.L.R. 111 ±, J\Ir. Justice Sanford, speaking for the Court
stated:
"It is the right, 'long recognized' of a trader
engaged in an entirely private business, 'freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to the
parties 'vith "'ho1n he \vill deal.' (citations) Thus,
a retail dealer has the unquestioned right to stop
dealing \Yith a 'vholesaler for reasons satisfactory
to hi1nself. (Citations.) He 1nay lawfully make a
fixed rule of conduct not to buy from a producer
or 1nanufacturer \vho sells to constm1ers in competition 'vith himself. (Citations.) Or he may stop
dealing ''"·ith a wholesaler who he thinks is acting
unfairly in trying to under1nine his trade. ( Citations.) Likewise, a 'vhole sale dealer has the right
to stop dealing with a n1anufacturer for reasons
sufficient to himself. And he may do so because
he thinks such Inanufacturer is undermining his
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trade by selling either to a co1npeting \vholesaler
or to a retailer competing with his own custo1ners.
Such other wholesaler or retailer has the reciprocal right to stop dealing vvith the Inanufacturer. * 'M: *''
"A different case would of course be presented if the ~ayn1ond Company had co1nbined
and agreed vvith other wholesale dealers that none
\vould trade with any 1nanufacturer \vho sold to
other wholesale dealers co1npeting \vitli thelnselves, or to retail dealers co1npeting \Vith their
custo1ners. An act when lavvful vvhen done hy one
may become vvrongful vvhen done by many acting
in concert, taking on the for1n of a conspiracy
which 1nay be prohibited if the result be hurtful
to the public or the individual against \Yhom the
concerted action is directed."
See also:

Menrnin Company v. Federal Trade Co1nmission,
288 Fed. 744, 30 A.L.R. 1127, Cert. denied, 67
L. Ed. 1219.
The san1e rule is set forth in 36 Am. J~tr., at
page 504:
''One who is not bound by contract or public
duty has the right under ordinary conditions to
refuse to sell his property to, or to have other
dealings with, any other person, absolutely or
conditionally, regardless of reason or 1notive; and
any loss or injury thereby inflicted upon the
other person is damnem absqu injuria, and gives
rise to no legal liability."
Citing:
Moore v. New York Cotton Excha,nge, 270 U.S.
593, 70 L. Ed. 750, 46 S. Ct. 367, 45 A.L.R. 1370;
Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.
Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 68 L. Ed. 448, 44 S. Ct.
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162, 30 A.L.R. 1114 ; (and 1nany other decisions).

The defendant by stipulation in open court, adn1itted
that in Utah, Idaho and Montana, prior to September
11, 1950 all quotations on synchron control, collective and
duplex collective control were made exclusively to original elevator contractors (R.. 858-859). There was absolutely no evidence which could possibly lead to the conclusion that it would have been illegal for the defendant
to continue its long, custo1nary and well establised method
of doing business.
In Associated Perfumers v. Andelmo;n, et al., 316
Mass. 176, 55 N.E. 2d 209, it is stated:
"Where considering a contract in the light of
business and situation of parties and circumstances with reference to which it was made, it
appears that restraint contracted for is an honest
purpose, is only such as affords a fair protection
to the legitimate interests of party in whose favor
it is imposed, and not so large as to interfere with
interests of the public, the restraint is reasonable
and the contract valid."
The rule is outlined in 17 C.J.S. at page 639:
''Subject to the rules of public policy against
contracts detrimental to the public interest and
lessening con1peti tion, and certain inhil;>itions
against con1binations in restraint of trade, agreements generally providing that one person will
trade or do business only with another person or
in a certain way for a definite or an indefinite
period are ordinarily valid if reasonable and
necessary to the protection of the interests of the
covenantee. The same is true of agreements restraining a person from carrying on business in
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certain pre1nises, or agreements reasonably restricting the use to be made of pren1ises. l\Iany
other agree1nents of si1nilar character have been
sustained by the courts as legal and binding obligations, where not unreasonably in restraint of
trade. Seymour l\{fg. Co. v. Derby ~Jfg. Co., 109...~
395, 94 Conn. 311."
In the Derby Mfg. Co. case the Court stated:
"Of course the defenda.nt cannot bid against
the plai.ntiff for any contract and a.t the sanl,e
time agree to a.ct as plaintiff's bailee for h~ire in
assisting to fill it. But this does not make the
bailment or the agree1nent as to tern1s on "\vhich
such bailment will thereafter be undertaken, illegal at common law or under the Shern1an Act.

"It is also claimed that the contract is illegal
because the defendant a,grees not to make a.ny bid
or take any order for bands. We find no prohibition in the contract against the defendant accepting business on its o'vn account. (It is only 'vhere
the agree1nent is concerned between then1 as to
price and this has nothing to do with restraining
business between the parties.)"
United States v. Colga.te & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.
Ct. 465, 63 L. Ed. 992, holds :

"In the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly the Sher1nan Anti Trust Act
of July 2, 1890 does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer, engaged
in an entirely private business, freely to exercise
·his own independent discretion as to the parties
with who1n he will deal and to announce in advance
the circumstances under which he refuses to sell."
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Positive Number Three:

THE AGREEMENT IS SUPPORrrED BY LEG·AL
CONSIDERATION.
Defendant argues that positively nothing passed
fron1 the plaintiff to the defendant in support of the
agTeement which could possibly constitute a legal consideration.
Defendant does not recognize the tilne, effort and
expens~ occasioned on plaintiff's part in securing good
will, local con ta.cts, copies of specifications, and estimations including the defendant's materials and relay systems on a job. It was shown by a positive preponderance
of the evidence that the plaintiff constantly and without
exception atten1pted to convince its prospects of the
superior quality of the defendant's signal and relay
control systen1; that plaintiff did not seek quotations on
such systen1s from the defendant's competitors; that the
defendant kne\v plaintiff was dealing exclusively with the
defendant in this regard; and that defendant knew plaintiff \Vas esti1natin_g and including defendant's equipment
specifically in its quotations to the customer or building
O\vners. Also there was certainly a promise from the
defendant to the plaintiff that \vhen plaintiff requested
and secured a quotation on Elevator Supplies 1naterial
and thereafter based thereon made plaintiff's bid to the
customer including defendant's material, that defendant
\Vould not bid directly to that customer. There was also
a pron1ise running fron1 the plaintiff to use defendant's
1naterial since it was unequivocally established such was
all plain tiff ever specified and estimated.
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All of the parts of a transaction will be considered
to ascertain vvhether a consideration sustains a contract.
Bennett v. Bau.m, 133 N.W. 439, 90 Neb. 320.
Mutual pro1nises express or i1nplied furnish consideration for an executory contract. McDonald v. ---~fc
Donald, Tex. Civ. App. 143 S.W. 2d 142.
A consideration for a proinise is an act other than
a promise, a forbearance, the creation, 1nodification
or destruction of a legal relation, or a return pro1nise.
Latin~er v. Holla.day, 134 P. 2d 183, 103 Utah 152.
A pro1nise for a promise is good consideration and
will always support a contract. Chicago Title and T,rust
Co. v. Two-0-0ne Building ·corporation., 32 N.E. 2d 352,
308 Ill. App. 673.
Where contract by \Vhich defendant co1npany \Yas
made an exclusive distributor of defendants radios,
refrigerators, and vvas.hing Inachines within a certain
territory lacked mutuality at its inception, evidence of
performance by defendant established that a "consideration" arose which related back to unilateral promise and
caused contract to become obligatory. Hedeman v.
Fairbanks Morse & Co., 36 N.E. 2d 129, 286 N.Y. 240.
Although the manager of the Pacific Elevator and
Equipment Company of San Francisco, had been asociated with the plaintiff company for a period of approximately two years only, he testified that it was valuable
for his company to have a representative in the intermountain area. The defendant company, after having
associated with the plaintiff for more than twenty-five
years, would now assert that the representation of the
plaintiff and the close business association of the parties
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\Vas ab~olutely of no Yalue. The con1parison of comments
1nade by con1panies in so1newhat the san1e field accentuate the attitude of the defendant. It is obvious:
Firstly, the defendant con1pany knew that plaintiff
\vas quoting the customers on equipment \vhich it had
Inanufactured, trade-n~n1ed and offered to plaintiffunder
'''ritten specifications on particular jobs.
Secondly, the defendant knew that the plaintiff was
bidding this n1aterial in the overall job to the plaintiff's
custon1ers.
Thirdly, the Elevator S·upplies Company knew that
the plaintiff was not securing quotation.s on similar equipment fron1 con1petitors of Elevator Supplies (R. 296).
Fourthly, it was of direct value to the defendant
to have its equip1nent quoted for sale.
Fifthly, there 'vas an irrevocable commitment made
by the Kimball Elevator Company to the Elevator Supplies Co1npany
to purchase the· material, if the plain,
tiff \Vere awarded a job. The plaintiff could not but install the defendant's system, since the system had been
diseussed and featured in direct talks and dealings with
the custo1ner.
Disregarding the acts of the plaintiff in supporting
defendant's products,· even slight consideration is sufficient to sustain a con tract and courts will not look closely
into the adequacy of consideration. Brawley v. Research
Foundation) 166 P. 2d 392, 73 Cal. App. 2d 103.
Defendant knew
through the plaintiff
mutuality of contract
Mas on Walsh Co., 33

and understood it would benefit
and in this regard there was a
existing between them. Y o'l1/n.g v.
F. Supp. 358; City of Atlanta v.
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Del( alb, 26 S.E. 2d 334, 196 Ga. 252; Western Bea·uty
S·upply Co. v. Duart Sales Co., 133 P. 2d 202, 192 Old.
6. In this situation giving rise to this case plaintiff had
fulfilled its part by making a bid to the hotel undeniably
including defendant's relay control system.

The agreement was not waived by the plaintiff and
the evidence by a great preponderance supports the
finding of the jury and its verdict.
Positive

N~tmber

Fottr:

THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT WAIVED.
The representative of the defendant co1npany, both
in his deposition and on the witness stand before the jury,
denied that he had received a call from the plaintiff colnpany requesting a supporting bid or estimate for the
hotel on the overall job and that he had ever discussed
this with Mr. Henker of the Pacific Company before coining with him to Salt Lake City.
Henker states positively that the representative of
the defendant company talked with him about the situation sometime prior to the trip of August 29th to Salt
Lake City. He stated the conversation vvas between hinlself and Roy Smith by telephone, in person, or by both
methods. Although Henker could not remen1ber the exact
words of the conversation, he definitely was of the san1e
impression as Roy Smith that there were no other bidders
than Kimball on the job, that the __ hotel wanted a check
bid or an estimate and that due to the situation of Elevator Supplies and Pacific, any estimate given by then1
to the hotel would be so much higher that necessarily
the job would automatically go to Kimball. He further
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pointed out that he had refused to give any figures to the
defendant company until he had definitely determined
that Dan Connole and Roy Smith were in agree1nent.
After working to secure a job since prior to 1946
it is not reasonable to assume that Kimball could have
been in agree1nent for Elevator Supplies to make a firm
bid and take the contract. Neither could the defendant'
so conclude or reasonably ask the jury to so conclude.
Mrs. R.od Connole, Mr. Henker and Dan Connole testified
to the contrary and Roy Smith's statements in the Kimball office shows that he was definitely in agreement
\vith them.
Counsel for appellant argues that this would be contrary to public policy and void and cites McMullin v.
Hoffn~an) 174 U.S. 1117, 43 Lawyers Ed. 683, and cases
of sin1ilar import, as authority for this position. The
JJJ cJJullin case concerned a secret agreement between
bidders on a public contract for the improvement of the
water supply of the city of Portland. It was a collusive
agreement. The Supreme Court concludes its statement
of the facts with this statement. "This community of
interest was to be kept secret and concealed from all
persons including the water committee." The case is
not in point at all since Mr. Connole not only introduced
the n1a.nager of Hotel U t.ah to defendant's representative,
and took representatives ·of Hotel Utah to the Medical
Arts Building pent house to see the defendant's relay
control systen1 in operation and also on one occasion this
was done in Roy Smith's company. There is no question
but what the Hotel Utah people knew the plaintiff was
using Elevator Supplies' system and certainly Connole
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told the representatives of the hotel that any quotation
by Elevator Supplies could be only an estimate. The facts
were on the table a.s far as plaintiff and the hotel \vere
concerned and the McMullin v. Hoffman case or any
other case based upon collusion, is not good authority
here.
In addition to the close association of the parties,
their frequent visits together to the Hotel Utah and the
conferences concerning the equipment sold by the defendants, the building engineer Jerry Smith \Vas directly
informed by Connole of the plaintiff company th-at any
bid made by the defendant could only be an estin1ate as
it was the same equipment set forth in the Kimball bid.
One definition of collusion set forth by Black's Lazv
Dictionary, page 352, reads :
"A secret arrange1nent between two or n1ore
persons, whose interests are apparently conflicting, to make use of the for1ns and proceedings of
law in order to defraud a third person, or to obtain that which justice would not give them, by
deceiving a court or its officers. Baldvvin v. New
York, 45 Barb. (N.Y.) 359; Belt v. Blackburn,
28 1\fd. 235; Railroad Co. v. Gay, 86 Tex. 571, 26
S.W. 599, 25 L.R.. A. 52; Balch v. Beach, 119 Wis.
77, 95 N.W. 132.
"In divorce proceedings, collusion is an agreement between husband and wife that one of them
shall co1n1ni t, or appear to have committed, or be
represented in court as having committed, acts
constituting a cause of divorce, for the purpose of
enabling the other to obtain a divorce. Civil Code
Cal. 114. But also means connivance or conspiracy
in initiating or prospecting the suit, as where
there is a compact for mutual aid in carrying it
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through to a decree. Beard v. Beard, 65 Cal. 354,
4 P. 229; Pohlman v. Pohln1an, 60 N.J. Eq. 28,
46 Atl. 658; Drayton v. Drayton, 54 N.J. Eq. 298,
38 A. 25; Harne v. Harne, 141 Md. 123, 118 A.
122, 123; Stewart v. Stewart, 93 N.J. Eq. 1, 114
A. 851, 852; McCauley v. McCauley, 88 N.J. Eq.
392, 103 A. 20, 23; Underwood v. Underwood, 50
App. D.C~ 323, 271 F. 553, 555."
The forthright statements. to the Hotel Utah by Connole of the plaintiff corporation do wholly away with
contentions by defendant that the plaintiff attempted
to collude against the hotel. Consider the conversation
bet,veen Jerry Smith of the hotel and the representative
of the plaintiff. Also examine the fringe of the testimony
given by the witnesses Smith, Jerry· and Roy, regarding
the request of the hotel for a direct quotation. The jury
considered the entire circu1nstances and found for the
plaintiff.
Jerry Smith produced a telephone check to prove he
had called San Francisco on this subject. Roy Smith
stated he had been called but that he did not make a
decision because he had to contact the home office. He
gave the same state1nent from Seattle sometime later.
Not only did. Smith of the Hotel Utah know it was an
extraordinary ·request and understand the reason the
defendant hesitated to bid but he n1ust have also realized
the ·situation ·in which Elevator Supplies found itself.
No fraud or collusion .was atte1npted by the plaintiff.
No over-estiinated contract was submitted to the Hotel
by the plain tiff.
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Posi.tive N 11;mber Five:
rr,HE A WARD OF

DA~fAGES

WAS JUSrr,

The appellant assigns a substantial portion of the
argument in its brief to a claim that the award by the
jury is excessive. Counsel attempted before the jury to
con1pare the experience of the defendant on the job and
the figures used by the plaintiff in its quotation to the
hotel. The defendant asserted-we did not 1nake a profit
so you 1nust not give the plaintiff a verdict, the plaintiff
would have lost on this job. We in fact rescued then1
fro1n their own folly.
The plaintiff invited the court and jury to scrutinize
its books and records. The summarization of its calculations on the hotel job was introduced as exhibit "SSS".
That exhibit actually shows a n1argin of $12,899.08. The
jury. cut this ite1n of da1nage to $8,555.00.
This Court has repeatedly held that a verdict 1nust
be plainly wrong and manifestly against the 'veight of
the evidence in order for it to be set aside. People v.
Swasey, 6 U. 9,3, 21 P. 400; United' States v. Brown, 6
Wn. 115, 21 P. 461.
The plaintiff submitted only one proposal to the
Hotel Utah before the job was taken by the defendant in
its own name. Yet the brief of counsel for appellant goes
on and on claiming the award of damages is excessive
since there were items in its $79,500 contract which the
plaintiff had not figured. Mr. Connole explained the
significance of the items of repair recommended by
Henker of the Pacific Company both from the functional
standpoint and monitary cost. Most of the items, with
the exception of the drive sheaves and hoisting cables
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had been originally included. Surprisingly, even if counsel's argun1ents _were competent, the a'vard would still
hold as being fair, just, and reasonable. Counsel would
attack the business acumen of the Kimball people; however, Roy C. Smith repeatedly "indicated that the Kimball
people knew their bu:siness.
Counsel for appellant stay on the_ old i·ule of law that
profits 'vhich are pur~ly imaginary and speculative may
not be assigned as an item of damage or recovered because they are not pro~able.
Plaintiff brought before the jury its business experience on the l\1edical Arts _job and also showed the court
and jury its books and records. Exhibit "SS-S" was a
complete su1n1narization and certainly justified and supports the finding of a loss of profits, which could well
exceed the figure awarded by the jury.
This honorable court will remember that the· defendant had quoted to the plaintiff. upon a substantial
portion of the job on an installed basis and that its price
to the plaintiff company included a discount of 10%.
The plaintiff had a margin of 10% in the quotation made
by the defendant .. The Pacific Elevator and Equipment
Co. -had quot~d equipn1ent at a certain price_ and had
also given an esti1nate of the _'~crew days" required to
con1plete the: job. The Dahlstrom Cab Co. al~o offered
pl~intiff a discount of 10% and the allowance of $1800.00
fo:r cabs 'vould bring the plaintiff at a price of $180 on
each· cab; ho,vever, as indicated by the manager of the
plaintiff con1pany_ th~ cost of cabs would undoubtedly go
well over $3,QOO and would there~ or-~ : return _a p;rof-~t
t<;> the plain tiff in excess of the $180_ per cab shown. on
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exhibit "SSS". Since the plaintiff figured his cost on the
installed and con1plete job it was proper for the court to
receive and for the jury to consider a difference between
the quoted price to the customer and the cost of Inaterials, labor and taxes as being the margin of the profit.
Consider the following:
Profits has been defined to be the ari thinetical excess of the price received over the total of
all cost to the seller, and accordingly profits cannot be computed until the total cost is determined. Hanley Co. v. Bradley, 259 N.Y.S. 279, 145
Misc. 285.
Profit is the acquisition beyond expenditure
excess of value received for producing, keeping or
selling over cost; hence pecuniary gain ·in any
transaction or occupation; emolument. Mundy v.
VanHoose, 30 S.E. 783, 104 Ga. 292.
Profits as contained in an action for breach
of contract stating measure of damages to be the
loss of 'profits' occasioned by such breach; means
the gain which would have been made if the contract would have been complete. Hincley v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 7 S. Ct. 875, 121 U.S.
264, 30 L. Ed. 967.
The conclusion is warranted by the facts found.
The accuracy of the plaintiff's figures were attacked
by counsel before the- jury and also in their brief on
appeal; however, the record discloses the honorable
court made_certain that the figures set forth in exhibit
"SSS" were accurate, not only were th.e items substantiated through the quotations received from subcontractors, but also the cost of the "crew day" and materials required for the job were explained by the plain-

45

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tiff's 1nana.ger through his personal experience on other
elevator projects and his knowledge of the labor market.
l\Ir. Connole very adequately showed that though the job
was figured at a low marginal profit this was done to
insure the prestige and advertisement the company would
realize through the installation of its elevators at the
Hotel Utah.
It is to be recognized that if the plaintiff had gone
ahead at the hotel in its own name and right that the
item of profits could be more accurately set forth as a
fact; ho,vever, since it was wrongful conduct and breach
of contract on the part of the defendant that took the job
away fron1 the plaintiff, the defendant is not in position
to complain about the accuracy of proof of profit. S.ee
Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P. 2d 651;
Natt'-"ral Soda Products v. City of Los Angeles, 143 P. 2d
12, 23 Cal. 2d 193; Ziwn v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation, 149 P.
2d 177, 24 Cal. 2d 290-; Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer
Co., 26 Cal. 2d 634, 160 P. 2d 812.
See also Hacker Pip,e & Supply Co. v. Chapman
Val·re Ill anufacturing Co., 62 P. 2d 944, 17 Cal. App. 2d
265, wherein the court stated:
"It is well established that damages consisting
of the loss of anticipated profits need not be established with certainty. It is sufficient that it be
shown as a reasonable probability that the profits
would have been earned except for the breach of
the contract. As stated in Pye v. Eagle Lake
Lun1ber Co., 66 Cal. App. 584, 277 P. 193, 195,
quoting from Kennett v. Katz Const. Co., 273 Mo.
279, 202 S. W. 558, ' "While the actual amount
of damages from the breach of a contract may not
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be susceptible of exact proof, the la'v does not
permit one whose act has resulted in loss to another to escape liability on this account." * * *
The law requires "only that the best evidence be
adduced of which the nature of the case is capable."' It is held generally that the breach of an
exclusive sales agency contract through the invasion of the territory of the agent (which is substantially the case in hand) will entitle the latter
to the profits he would have made upon sales in
the amount of those made by his principal in the
invaded territory. Schiffman v. Peerless Motor
Car Co., 13 Cal. App. 600, 110 P. 460, 462; Bredemeier v. Pacific Supply Co., 64 Or. 576, 131 P.
312, 313. In ascertaining the a1nount of da1nage
it is proper to assume that one who has an established sales agency vvould have been able to
conduct his business in the usual n1anner, except
for the interference, and it is therefore proper to
take into consideration, in estimating profits alleged to have been lost, the volume of business
done in the past and the percentage of profit n1ade
thereon. Schumann v. Karrer, 184 Cal. 50, 192
P. 849; Yaguda v. niotion Picture Publications,
Inc., 140 Cal. A pp. 195, 35 P. 2d 162; Erskine
v. Marchant, 37 Cal. App. 590, 174 P. 74; Sanford
v. East Riverside Irrigation District, 101 Cal. 275,
35 P. 865; National Oil Refining & ~ffg. Co. v.
Producers' Ref. Co., 169 Cal. 740, 147 P. 963."
The same result is reached by the court in Gr'tt.pe
v. Click, 26 Cal. 2d 680,160 P. 2d 840:
"Upon this question, it is held that where
the operation of an established business is prevented or interrupted, as by a tort or breach of
contract or warranty, damages for the loss of
prospective profits that otherwise might have
been made from its operation are generally recoverable for the reason that their occurrence and
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extent 1nay be ascertained 'vith reasonable certainty from the past volume of business and
other provable data relevant to the probable future sales. (Overstreet v .. Merritt, 186 Cal. 494,
200 P. 11 (breach of contract) and nu1nerous other
cases.)"
It has been said that "if a man make a better mousetrap than his neighbor - the world wi~l make a beaten
track to his door," - but he must first tell the world
that he has the mousetrap. This is the medium of advertising.
The plaintiff for more than twenty years had its
nan1epla tes on the thresholds of the. cabs of the three
pas~enger elevators at the Hotel Utah. This hotel is one
of the very finest in the country. The plaintiff enjoyed
this prestige, used a picture of the hotel on the cover of
an advertising pan1phlet or company brochure, and the
n1anager of the plaintiff stated that this had an advertising value ·of a.t least $30,000.00. An advertising expert
testified that in his opinion the names of any company on
the threshold of the three elevators would have a value
of at least one thousand dollars per year.
Counsel for appellant argue that the pl~ntiff could
not sustain a loss in this respect since the hotel did not
permit a na1ne on the threshold of the new cabs and,
that even though ICi1nball had done the job and completed
the modernization it "\vould be a misnomer for plaintiff's
name to be there; and that such, if there, would amount
to false advertising.
This argun1ent runs squarely in the face of the established and standard custom in the elevator industry.
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Name plates are used not only in the state of Utah hut
throughout the United States. Peculiarly nothing \vas
said to Connole concerning either the use of nan1e plates
or the re1noval of threshold nameplates. This "\Vas discussed between Jerry and R·oy Smith of the defendant
con1pany; however, the discussion took place long after
Septe1nber 27, 1950, when defendant breached its contract
with plaintiff and severallnonths after the dispute arose
bet-vveen the parties and the plain tiff had 1nade its demands upon the defendant con1pany. If plaintiff had been
awarded the contract and proceeded in continued good
-vvill its na1ne would have been in- the lobby and at the
entrance of each floor of the hotel - for at least a Ininimun1 of ten years and perhaps for twenty-five years.
Its loss in this_ regard was obvious to the jury and the
subject of its unani1nous verdict for the minimun1 ten
years under the interest a1nortization schedule. The jury
was certainly temperate in its decision. Counsel for appellant cannot reasonably show the verdict excessive.
This element of damage could have been doubled.
There is some confusion in the arguments raised by
appellant concerning the legal right of the plain tiff to
use its name where it has not actually produced all of the
equipment making up the complete elevator. There does
not seem to be any direct, in-point authority on this
subject. Perhaps the situation of the elevator "manufacturer" or contractor is similar to the question of the
right to use a "trade-name" as distinguished from a
"trade 1nark". As explained by one of the witnesses,
various trade marked articles may go into a co1nplete
machine which will end up with a trade-name.
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The following is set forth in 52 An1. J ur. 509:
"The term 'trade na.1ne' is used in various
senses. Thus, it has sometimes been used to indicate a mark affixed to goods where such mark
is not originally susceptible of exclusive appropriation but has acquired a secondary meaning. It
has also been used to indicate a part or all of a
firn1 name or a partnership name. In its most
common usage, it means a. name, word, or phrase
en1ployed by one engaged in business, as a means
of identifying his products, business or services,
and of establishing good will. * * * A trade name
also involves the individuality of the n1aker, for
protection in trade, to avoid confusion in business,
and to secure the advantages of a good reputation,
and therefore it js said to have a broader scope
than a trademark. It has also been declared that
it is n1ore properly applied to the good will of the
business. Therefore, while a trademark may consist of a na1ne, a tradename as herein defined is
not regarded as a traden1ark in the strict technical
sense."
and continuing the text 52 Ant. Jur. 513:

"* * * A tradename is also said to be a species
of property, and, while not strictly a trademark
will as a general rule be protected in like manner.
The theory
. of this is that a man may. have acquired a r.eputation for excellence in the manufacture or preparation of a certain article for sale,
'vhich reputation 1nay be a source of profit to him
in the enjoyment of which he ought to be protected."
There can be no question concerning the value of
advertising. American business and industry spends
Inore for advertising media than any other country in the
world. The plaintiff enjoyed the finest medium avail-
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able in its operating area and th.e jury was one hundred
per cent correct in awarding plaintiff damages for loss
of advertising and prestige. The verdict is legal and
proper.

Positi.ve Number Six:
THE TRIAL WAS. FAIR
The actual trial of this case ·ran for a number of
days, interspersed with· continuations required by the
regular district assignments of the trial judge. Consequently the Court attempted to restrict evidence to the
issues set by the pTe-trial order and by stipulations of
counsel in meetings in ch.ambers.
Counsel for appellant wanted to establish certain
notariety among the elevator trade for defendant's reputation as an independent or prime contractor by showing direct bidding; however, after the consummation of
several hours of trial time it was stipulated the Elevator Supplies Company had quoted to elevator companies other than plaintiff but that it had never been a
prime contractor, not even for the installation of dumb
waiters. The explanation of these issues by the trial
judge, of which the defendant now so strongly co1nplains,
could not have been prejudicial.
From the very beginning of this lawsuit, plaintiff
based its case on an implied agreement. Defendant denied it had any agreement with the plaintiff, argued the
reason for its denial and the non existence of such an inlplied agreement before the jury. The issue was one of
fact. The jury found in favor of plaitiff. The facts are
supported by the great preponderance of the evidence.
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CONCLUSION
The verdict of the jury is well founded by the record,
and the evidence-both oral and documentary as set forth
therein. The issues were outlined originally in plaintiff's
complaint and it amended complaint, and through written interrogatories and depositions prior to the trial
of the cause. Plaintiff positively maintains that through
a long course of business dealings with the defendant
an implied agreement existed. The defendant had fair
and unlimited opp·ortunity to set forth its denial and
proof of the nonexistence of such an agreement.
After both sides had offered its proof, issues were
fully and finally presented through the instructions of
the court. The findings and verdict were in favor of the
plaintiff. Considering its loss of profit, and prestige
over the years, the amount of the verdict awarded to
the plaintiff is little compensation for its actual damages.
Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court uphold
the action of the lower court and jury; and that plaintiff be awarded the judgment as entered and its costs
as respondent on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN,
Attorney for Plaintiff ood
Respondent.
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